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The Peoples Republic of China (PRC), 
Taiwan, and peoples of Chinese ancestry 
resident in the Pacific Islands have figured 
prominently in news items concerning the 
Pacific in recent years.2  In April 2006, post-
election violence erupted in the Solomon 
Islands’ capital, Honiara, following the 
declaration of the Deputy Prime Minister of 
the unpopular out-going government, Snyder 
Rini, as the new Prime Minster.  Much of 
Honiara’s Chinatown was burned and looted. 
The purchase of votes through use of Chinese 
money was seen by many as a major reason 
for the government’s retention of power 
(Kabutaulaka 2006: 424; Dobell 2007: 10, 18-
19).  In November 2006, most of Nuku’alofa’s 
commercial heart was destroyed by rioters 
angered at the Legislative Assembly going 
into recess for the year without voting on 
proposals for major democratic reforms 
to Tonga’s parliamentary system, which 
effectively excludes the majority commoner 
population from a say in government. Again, 
Chinese businesses were among the targets, 
and strong anti-Chinese sentiment was 
apparent among the perpetrators (People’s 
Daily Online, November 17, 2006).  While 
longer-term Chinese residents in both 
countries have long been prominent in local 
business activities and built constructive 
relationships with local peoples, these two 
incidents fuelled mounting concern within 
the region about the impact of recent Chinese 
arrivals.  Recently arrived Chinese business 
people are often involved in short-term 
extractive industries such as logging and 
are seen to be less sensitive than longterm 
Chinese residents to local community needs. 
A number of recent arrivals have been linked 
to criminal activities.
These disturbances were also linked 
by many commentators to rivalry between 
Taiwan and the PRC for influence among 
Pacific Island nations, and particularly to how 
‘cheque-book’ diplomacy was destabilizing 
domestic and regional politics.  Order was 
only restored in both the Solomon Islands and 
Tonga by troops and police from Australia 
and New Zealand, and smaller numbers 
from several other Pacific Island nations in 
the case of the Solomon Islands.  There is 
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now increasing consensus in Canberra and 
Wellington that such interventions must be 
accompanied by much longer-term, deeper 
engagements to tackle the root causes of 
problems and dissatisfaction in Pacific Island 
nations.  This intermeshing of local, regional 
and global interests has complicated the 
search for solutions.
As the PRC has become increasingly 
central to the global economy, the number 
of states recognising Taiwan has diminished. 
Taiwan’s financial efforts to retain diplomatic 
relations with those states recognizing it have 
intensified as the PRC’s economic means and 
efforts to exert political influence to win over 
Taiwan’s adherents have also increased.  PRC 
pressure has been effective worldwide, with 
seven of the nations that recognized Taiwan 
worldwide having withdrawn that recognition 
since Chen Shui-bian became Taiwan’s 
President in 2000. Six of the remaining 
twenty-four countries that recognise Taiwan 
are Pacific Islands nations (The China Post, 
10 August 2006), namely Kiribati, Marshall 
Islands, Palau, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and 
Nauru.  The remaining eight Pacific Islands 
nations - Cook Islands, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, Niue, Papua New Guinea, 
Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu all recognize the 
PRC.  Both Taiwan and the PRC organized 
forums in the Pacific Islands region in 2006 
attended for the first time by their respective 
heads of state, at which generous increases in 
aid and loan programmes were announced. 
The PRC’s Premier Wen Jiabao attended 
the first China-Pacific Islands Countries 
Economic Development and Cooperation 
Forum in Fiji in April, while the Taiwanese 
President Chen Shui-bian flew to Palau in 
September for the first Taiwan Pacific Allies 
Summit (Shanghai Daily, 6 April 2006; 
Hwang 2006). 
Opinion remains divided on the 
consequences of this increased presence 
and the influence of PRC and Taiwanese 
interests in the Pacific Islands.  Chinese 
diaspora business elements from Southeast 
Asia have also become more prominent in 
the Pacific Islands region in recent years. 
There is division on whether this recent 
rise in overall Chinese activity will be 
sustained.  This paper investigates these key 
issues, highlights areas where information 
is uncertain or unavailable, then outlines 
the schools of thought concerned with these 
matters in the Pacific and elsewhere, before 
suggesting a variety of regional and national 
responses that might be appropriate given the 
evidence available.
the Current ChineSe PreSenCe in 
the PaCifiC iSlandS
Ethnic Chinese populations in the Pacific 
Islands generally make up less than 1 percent 
of the total population, but invariably figure 
prominently in business.  Emeritus Professor 
Ron Crocombe estimated the total Chinese 
population in the Pacific Islands at around 
80,000 as of October 2006.  The main 
concentrations are around 20,000 each in 
Papua New Guinea and Fiji, 15,000 in the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, 
14,000 in French Polynesia, and 4,000 in 
Guam (Crocombe cited in Dobell 2007: 14).
The leading authority on Chinese 
communities in the Pacific Islands, Emeritus 
Professor Bill Willmott, emphasizes that each 
local community is distinct and also internally 
differentiated by factors such as class, time of 
arrival, and place of origin.  While long-term 
Pacific Island Chinese develop a local identity, 
local loyalties, and local connections over 
time, most still marry other Chinese and family 
remains their prime social focus.  Rates of 
inter-marriage between resident Pacific Island 
Chinese communities and local indigenous 
populations vary between localities.  Chinese 
Pacific Islanders are invariably prominent in 
business, although the most recent generation 
are also well represented in professions such 
as doctors and lawyers.  Many members of 
the long-term Chinese communities express 
concern about recent Chinese arrivals’ lack of 
sensitivity to local ways, and are just as likely 
to view them as disruptive competitors than 
as potential business and marriage partners. 
These latter arrivals are known as huayi, a 
Mandarin term meaning ethnic Chinese that 
is particularly applied to ethnic Chinese with 
passports other than from the PRC.  Huayi 
are distinguished from previous migrants by 
their weak ties to the PRC, and their high 
   China in the Pacific

such activities on Australia’s doorstep has 
significant implications for security and 
border control.  Investigations by the South 
Pacific desk of the Australian Federal Police 
revealed criminal elements were using 
the islands as an entry point to Australia, 
particularly for people–smuggling operations. 
In contrast, Chinese residents with roots in 
the islands prior to 1990 remain one of the 
most law-abiding communities in the region 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2006: 165, 175; 
Murray 2006: 15).  
The main focus of Australian government 
concern about Chinese influence in the Pacific 
has been directed towards the disbursement 
of funds by the governments of the PRC 
and Taiwan rather than Chinese criminal 
elements.  The PRC’s new increased aid 
package announced by Premier Wen Jiabao 
at the opening of the first China-Pacific 
Island Countries Economic Development and 
Cooperation Forum in Fiji in April 2006 is 
valued at 3 billion yuan or $US398 million at 
current exchange rates. Most will be dispensed 
in the form of low interest preferential loans 
favouring primary industries such as fishing 
and agriculture.  These loans will be typically 
set at interest rates of around 2% for terms 
of up to 20 years.  Generous grace periods 
are also provided for, with the additional 
possibility that loans extended in this way 
could also be turned into grants on a case by 
case basis.  Other measures announced then 
included the cancellation of debts maturing 
at the end of 2005 and removal of tariffs on 
exports to the PRC from the least developed 
Pacific nations.  Arrangements to provide 
free anti-malarial medicines and training for 
2000 government officials and technicians 
were also put in place.  Additional bilateral 
arrangements were signed with the eight 
Pacific Island nations that support the PRC 
rather than Taiwan (Wen 2006).  
None of these provisions is tied to 
adherence to accountability and transparency 
criteria as Australian aid is. Thus PRC aid has 
the potential to undermine Australia’s leverage 
with Pacific Island governments by providing 
an alternative source of aid not dependent 
on implementing the reforms sought by 
Australia.  Aid from the PRC places New 
degree of mobility in search of opportunities 
in the global economy that has emerged over 
the last three decades.  While the businesses 
of more established Chinese are perceived as 
benefiting locals, those of huayi tend towards 
get rich quick enterprises that bring little 
evident benefit to locals.  Willmott notes that 
some of the former were warned by locals 
of the impending burning and looting of 
Honiara’s Chinatown (Willmott 2007).
There have been several distinct phases 
of Chinese migration to and influence in the 
Pacific Islands region.  With the exception 
of occasional Chinese crew members on 
Western vessels sailing into the Pacific from 
the 1500s onwards, Chinese initially came to 
the Pacific Islands from the mid nineteenth 
century in limited numbers as traders or 
labourers.  This pattern persisted until the 
1980s.  Chinese migration into the Pacific has 
increased markedly since the opening up of 
the PRC and the economic reform programme 
initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s. 
This period also saw the rise of activities in 
Island states to extract relatively untapped 
natural resources such as timber and fisheries. 
These activities are largely controlled by 
huayi businessmen from Chinese Diaspora 
communities in Southeast and East Asia 
who invest their profits overseas. They have 
allies within the ranks of local politicians, 
but are generally disliked by the local 
population as a whole.  The mining sector 
does not follow this pattern however, with 
Chinese participation consisting mainly of 
PRC government involvement in Papua New 
Guinea (Crocombe 2007: 26).  The post-1980 
wave of Chinese initially consisted largely of 
low-skilled factory and extractive industry 
workers.  Subsequent arrivals have gradually 
expanded into other sectors.  
Chinese criminal activities in the Islands 
are also associated with Chinese who have 
moved to the islands since 1990.  Setting up 
in island nations has advantages for criminal 
elements.  As Crocombe notes, ‘Smuggling 
of drugs, weapons and illegal immigrants, 
money laundering, fraud, extortion, forced 
prostitution and other activities are easy in 
Islands countries that cannot afford extensive 
police and other protective services.’ 
(Crocombe 2007: 28) The presence of 
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Zealand in a similar dilemma in its attempts 
to apply leverage to Fiji’s current government 
to persuade it to restore democracy.
Taiwan has significantly increased its total 
foreign aid budget over the last decade from 
around NT$ 1.4 billion (US$ 42 million) per 
year in the 1990s to NT$ 14 billion (US$ 
421 million) per year by 2006 (Hwang 2006; 
Chan 1997: 5).  A large, but unmeasurable 
proportion of this aid goes to Pacific Island 
nations.  Only 15% of Taiwanese aid is 
traceable in the public record as part of its 
International Cooperation and Development 
Fund (ICDF).  The remainder is disbursed 
through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
without transparency, to ensure this politically 
sensitive information is not able to be used 
by its rival the PRC to persuade recipients to 
switch allegiance.  A number of researchers 
have attempted to estimate the total amount 
of Taiwanese money disbursed to Pacific 
nations, but all remain at best speculative 
(Vltchek 2007; Dobell 2007).  Crocombe 
confirms the increasing influence of the PRC 
and Taiwanese governments, noting that 
the PRC has more diplomats in the Pacific 
Islands than any other nation, and that PRC 
business and government activity has become 
blurred in some instances, most noticeably in 
the PRC’s involvement with the Ramu nickel 
mine in Papua New Guinea (Crocombe 2007: 
26).  
Japan responded to rising PRC influence 
by increasing aid at the Fourth Japan-Pacific 
Islands Forum (PIF) Summit Meeting in 
Okinawa in May 2006 where it announced 
$US410 million in new aid to Pacific Island 
nations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 
2006).  This represents a dramatic rise in 
aid and was prompted by Japanese concerns 
about maintaining influence in Pacific 
Island nations to secure favourable access 
rights to rich fisheries within those nations’ 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and, to 
a lesser extent, securing their support in the 
International Whaling Commission.  Japan 
has a history of using its aid to secure these 
two objectives (Tarte 1998: 83, 96; Lobban 
& Schefter 1997: 274-277: Nero 1997: 
368, 377-378).3  The possibility of a three-
way bidding war between the PRC, Taiwan 
and Japan for Pacific Island loyalties now 
looms, something which also threatens to 
drag Australia, New Zealand and the US 
into the race if it continues and intensifies. 
Earlier this year, the Bush Administration 
declared 2007 the ‘Year of the Pacific’ as 
part of a move to re-engage with a region it 
perceives it has neglected since the fall of the 
Berlin Wall.  In July 2007 the public research 
unit of the US Congress, the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS), produced a thirty-
page report entitled ‘The Southwest Pacific: 
US Interests and China’s Growing Influence’ 
which warned of rising PRC influence in the 
southwest Pacific (Congressional Research 
Service 2007; O’Connor 2007).
Pacific Islanders have reacted to the 
increasing Chinese presence in a variety of 
ways.  The divide between unpopular political 
incumbents supported by Chinese private 
and government money and the majority of 
alienated voters denied government services 
in part because of corrupt practices has 
already caused violence in Solomon Islands 
and Tonga.  There has been an escalation of 
crimes by Islanders against ethnic Chinese 
and other Asians.  A host of reasons lie behind 
these trends.  In particular, Chinese are seen 
by some as an easy and profitable target, and 
they are resented for dominating local business 
opportunities, or for corrupting politicians 
and officials, and for extracting wealth 
and investing profits overseas rather than 
contributing to the community (Crocombe 
2007: 31).  In addition to the targeting of 
individual Chinese by Islanders with criminal 
intent, Pacific Island governments have not 
been passive victims of PRC and Taiwanese 
dollar diplomacy.  A number have sought to 
play one off against the other or have switched 
allegiance for financial inducements.  They 
have been able to do so because the financial 
costs involved are miniscule for the PRC and 
Taiwan so that the potential political benefits 
of recognition far outweigh the financial 
costs.4 
SChoolS of interPretation
A clear division has emerged in the 
outlook of Western commentators on Chinese 
influence in the Pacific Islands.  This division 
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mirrors others among Western government 
and academic international relations’ 
commentators about the implications of 
the PRC’s increasing influence in global 
politics and the world economy, and its aid 
priorities and policies in the developing 
world.  Choosing between these divergent 
perspectives has major implications for 
policy makers in South Pacific nations.5  It 
is therefore important for commentators on 
Chinese influence in the South Pacific to 
position their arguments within this wider 
debate, so as to acknowledge the existence 
of alternative views to their own, and to 
distinguish interpretation from reality when 
seeking amicable solutions to existing and 
potential clashes of interest between stake-
holders in the region.  
Commentators such as Graeme Dobell 
note mounting concern in the Pacific Islands, 
Canberra, and to a lesser extent Wellington, 
about the implications for Island state stability 
of two main developments.  One involves the 
negative impacts of aspects of the recent influx 
of Chinese, particularly crime syndicates and 
corrupt businessmen.  The second involves the 
rivalry between the PRC and Taiwan fostering 
corruption in domestic politics because of 
their failure to adhere to the normal rules of 
the ‘aid game’ and to recent Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) guidelines (Dobell 2007; OECD 
2007).  Dobell notes that these concerns have 
only gathered momentum in the last five 
years with the PRC’s economic take-off and 
the perceived diminishing of US influence in 
the Asia Pacific region.  Former New Zealand 
diplomat Michael Powles is less concerned. 
Having headed posts in both Beijing and the 
Pacific Islands, he believes the PRC’s record 
and statements consistently demonstrate 
a willingness to abide by international 
conventions, while obviously still pursuing 
its own national interest (Powles 2007).6
A division of opinion between optimistic 
and more cautious conclusions is also 
apparent in a second, related debate about the 
capacity of Pacific Island states to rectify their 
own problems.  Many of those that express 
serious concerns about Chinese influence in 
the Pacific also publish gloomy prognoses 
about the ability of states within the so-called 
‘Arc of Instability’ to Australia’s immediate 
north to make significant economic advances 
and secure political stability without external 
assistance.  Their concern about Chinese 
influence in Pacific nations reflects the 
assumption that some of these nations are failed 
states.  This group includes commentators 
such as Susan Windybank from the Centre 
for Independent Studies and Ben Reilly 
from the Australian National University. 
While many policy makers subscribe to this 
analysis, the majority of academic specialists 
on the Pacific have rejected or called for 
serious modification of the Arc of Instability 
paradigm.7  The most recent and most 
comprehensive publication arguing along 
these lines is Hank Nelson’s ‘Governments, 
States and Labels’ (Nelson 2006).  Those 
questioning the Arc of Instability paradigm 
urge more acknowledgement of the highly 
inadequate preparation for independence that 
these nations inherited from colonial powers 
like Australia and are therefore less willing 
to blame flawed government practices and 
corruption since independence for today’s 
problems.  They are also more cautious about 
the efficacy of applying foreign models to 
Pacific problems. 
As noted above, similar concerns and 
debates about the rise of Chinese influence are 
occurring beyond the Pacific.  It is therefore 
worthwhile briefly reviewing these to gain a 
sense of perspective over debates within the 
Pacific.  While many arguments used in the 
Pacific are also found in the context of Africa, 
the diplomatic bidding war between Taiwan 
and the PRC that occupies such a prominent 
place in Pacific discourse is much less 
pronounced elsewhere.  The main concerns 
there relate to the PRC’s relations with 
dictatorial regimes as part of efforts to gain 
access to the energy resources seen as crucial 
to the PRC’s sustained growth. Its increasing 
reliance on imports is a potential Achilles’ heel 
for the PRC that some observers believe will 
either push it into aggressive and potentially 
destabilizing foreign policy positions or 
necessitate a restrained and cooperative policy 
to ensure the free flow of energy resources it 
cannot control.  Competition for resources is 
rarely claimed to be important in the PRC-
Taiwan rivalry in the Pacific Islands.  The 
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PRC’s recent interest in Papua New Guinea’s 
mineral resources may signal a possible 
change in this regard.
Many analysts, particularly in the US, 
suggest that the PRC’s booming economic 
growth and the resultant political influence 
this confers will be short-lived.  They cite 
the gap between rich and poor in the PRC, 
serious environmental problems there, the 
lack of sufficient domestic energy sources, a 
legal system that does not encourage efficient 
business activities, corruption and a lack of 
political freedom as factors that may block 
economic advancement (Chang 2001; Segal 
1999; Pei 2006).  Others, perhaps the majority, 
believe the PRC is here to stay as a world 
power.  The massive flow of foreign direct 
investment into the PRC demonstrates that 
businessmen around the world also believe 
that the PRC’s current boom is sustainable 
and holds the prospect of a good return on 
their investment (Gosset 2006; Shobert 2006; 
Fallows 2006; Feffer 2006; Zhang 2003).
The PRC’s economic rise is also linked 
to its military potential.  The PRC is either 
seen as a threat to the Pacific status quo of 
US domination (Henderson and Reilly 2003), 
and potentially to the influence of Japan in 
the region, or as a benign power seeking 
conciliation and non-confrontation so as not 
to divert it from its prime aim of ensuring 
internal stability and development through 
economic growth.  For some, the PRC is 
merely filling the void in the region left by 
the decline of US global power (Kaplan 
2005, Zhang 2007).  However, talk of a power 
vacuum in the Pacific Islands because of US 
disengagement is somewhat overstated and 
misleading.  Such claims overestimate the 
previous influence of the US on independent 
Pacific Island nations’ decision-making, 
conflate military, political and economic 
influence, and blur the distinction between 
those Pacific Islands closely linked to the US 
in Micronesia and those with historical ties 
to Australia, New Zealand and France in the 
South Pacific that receive little US assistance. 
The only exception to this geographical 
division is American Samoa in the heart of 
the South Pacific.
US force deployment in the Pacific Islands 
has had little bearing on recent relations 
between independent Pacific Island nations 
and the PRC other than the bonds created 
between Pacific Island nations and the US 
through the significant ‘rent’ the US pays to 
its former trust territories in Micronesia for 
the use of bases in their sovereign territory. 
While the US recently announced a substantial 
and imminent increase in its forces based in 
Guam in the western Pacific (Pacific Daily 
News 2006), its intention to progressively cut 
back its payments to its former trust territories 
ending in 2023 may undermine its influence 
in the region around Guam and needs to 
be reassessed in light of the lack of viable 
alternative sources of income that have been 
proposed (United States 2006, D’Arcy 2006). 
Without such alternatives, Micronesian states 
may be tempted to seek aid from nations such 
as the PRC that do not necessarily share US 
foreign policy preferences for the region. 
Guam’s neighbour, Federated States of 
Micronesia, has already recognised the PRC, 
for example.
There is little argument that the PRC’s 
phenomenal economic growth, which has 
consistently averaged 11 percent per annum 
recently, is dependent on access to foreign 
energy sources, particularly from the Middle 
East and Africa.  Most of the nations that 
the PRC receives the majority of its oil 
from have non-democratic systems and poor 
human rights’ records in common with the 
PRC.  Western and particularly American 
commentators note the lack of political and 
economic preconditions attached to PRC aid 
to these nations, and international criticisms 
of a number of these nations for oppressive 
actions against their own people.  They 
contrast this experience with the so-called 
Washington consensus applied by the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund which 
ties assistance to progress in human rights, 
economic transparency, good governance and 
democracy.  The existence of this alternative 
‘value-free’ funding is seen to undermine 
the efficacy of the Washington consensus 
(Berkofsky 2007).  
A number of commentators point to 
the PRC’s increased defence spending in 
recent years as evidence that it is preparing 
to challenge the longstanding US military 
dominance of the Pacific (Gracie 2006; 
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Griffiths 2007).  It is also claimed that the 
PRC is discouraging support for Japan to be 
given a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council (Lancaster 2007).  While the PRC’s 
Pacific profile is certainly on the rise, more 
cautious voices note that much of the extra 
expenditure is needed to update the PRC’s 
military technology which is well behind 
that of the US. An estimated 30 percent of 
the PRC’s military budget is spent on salary 
increases to recruit and retain staff tempted to 
join the booming private sector, particularly 
skilled technicians so needed for modern high 
technology warfare (Berkofsky 2007).  
Furthermore, while the PRC is currently 
running a huge trade surplus of around US$150 
billion per year, this only equates to an annual 
trade surplus per capita of US$120 for this 
nation of 1.3 billion.  It will be a decade at 
least before domestic purchasing power and 
consumption can rise to levels that make the 
PRC’s growth self-sustaining. Until then, the 
PRC will remain heavily dependent on foreign 
investment and foreign customers.  It is not in 
the PRC’s interests to alienate its customers 
through aggressive diplomacy, while military 
action to secure energy resources is not 
really an option because of the PRC’s limited 
capacity to deploy significant military forces 
beyond its immediate neighbourhood.8  Of 
the six main suppliers who collectively 
provide almost two-thirds of the PRC’s 
oil, four are in the Middle East and two in 
Africa (Lee 2005).9  The deficit in the PRC’s 
domestically-generated energy is calculated 
to increase over time. This will be a serious 
problem for future economic growth that has 
prompted some to speculate that the PRC’s 
attempts to secure oil in closer, neighbouring 
areas may destabilize Central Asia (Lee 2005; 
Xu 2006).
These wider divisions of opinion within the 
international relations community are set out 
and reconciled in William Tow’s Asia Pacific 
Strategic Relations.  Tow distinguishes two 
broad approaches to international relations 
which he labels liberal and realist.  The 
former have a more optimistic view of 
state’s intentions and seek to resolve regional 
tensions through building institutions for 
regional cooperation that produce mutual 
benefits for participants, while the latter are 
more pessimistic and cautious about states’ 
intentions and therefore seek to keep the peace 
through maintaining a balance of power and 
adequate deterrents to aggressive behaviour.  
Both liberals and realists have legitimate 
viewpoints, as few if any states are wholly 
aggressive or wholly altruistic.  The tensions 
between the PRC and Taiwan that are central 
to this debate on the Chinese in the Pacific 
for example are characterized by both the 
intensification of informal social, cultural 
and especially economic exchanges across 
the Straits of Taiwan and continued tensions, 
arguments and threats from the PRC to 
reassimilate Taiwan by force.  Tow argues 
that only policies that carefully integrate 
both realist and liberal approaches can avoid 
confrontation in this dispute and others in the 
Asia Pacific region (Tow 2001:2-4).  This 
new ‘Convergent Security’ approach requires 
‘a managed transition from a regional security 
system based predominantly on realist-
orientated bilateral security arrangements 
to one based increasingly upon regional 
multilateral arrangements’ (Tow 2001: 
9).  According to Tow, Australia under the 
Howard Government initially adopted a realist 
position in the Asia Pacific region, which was 
subsequently tempered by a more liberal 
position based on the limits of its military 
capacity and diplomatic influence, and 
realization of the benefits to be derived from 
active participation in regional organizations 
in light of these limitations (Tow 2001: 154-
155).
imPliCationS for auStralia
The lack of preconditions accompanying 
expanding PRC and Taiwanese aid is 
particularly problematic for Australia because 
it has increased financial commitments to 
its Pacific neighbours in an effort to restore 
its preferred forms of government, but has 
also imposed significant conditions on this 
support in an effort to counter corruption 
and other problems.  For example, PRC 
aid has complicated attempts by Australia 
and New Zealand to tie aid to democratic 
reforms by the military government in Fiji 
by providing it with generous and abundant 
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alternative funding (fijivillage 4 July 2007; 
Matau 2007).  The Australian Senate Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee’s 
March 2006 report on the implications of the 
PRC’s rising prominence urged adherence to 
the OECD principles on official development 
assistance by all parties in the Pacific, and 
recommended that Australia should cooperate 
with the PRC on development assistance 
in the Pacific (Commonwealth of Australia 
2006).  Cooperation with the PRC in Pacific 
aid programmes was also recommended in 
an AusAID White paper the following month 
(AusAID 2006).  AusAID and DFAT officials 
have been conducting ongoing dialogue with 
PRC officials since then.
Australia faces a major decision about 
its Pacific policy in regard to the increasing 
Chinese influence in the region.  In 2002, 
the year before the Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), 
Australia’s aid commitment to Solomon 
Islands was $33 million. In 2003-4, aid to 
Solomon Islands jumped to $140 million, 
then $180 million in 2004-05, $234 million 
in 2005-06, and the budget for financial year 
2006-2007 is $223 million (Dobell 2007: 
11).  Broadly speaking, Australia has two 
options: it can either increase its aid in an 
attempt to counter Chinese influence in the 
Pacific and persuade or otherwise influence 
Pacific Island governments to adopt policies 
it sees as best for the region, or it can seek 
to work cooperatively with the PRC and 
Taiwan and Pacific Island governments to 
deliver development that benefits Islanders 
and preserves all parties’ national interests 
through a degree of compromise.  The cost 
and difficulties involved in operations in 
Solomon Islands, Bougainville, and East 
Timor alone suggest Australia cannot go it 
alone.  The feasibility of various avenues 
for such cooperation with either the PRC 
or Taiwan, or with both, is discussed in the 
following section.  Diminishing Australian 
influence and increased Chinese influence are 
the new Pacific regional realities for which 
Australia must now plan.
future PoSSibilitieS
Powles believes that Australia, New 
Zealand, and Pacific Island nations can 
influence PRC actions in ways that preserve 
and even enhance their own interests while 
still meeting the PRC’s needs (Powles 2007). 
Powles cites historical examples of the PRC 
Government’s behaviour and statements of 
intent to support his contention.  While his 
discussion concerns the PRC, many of his 
suggestions also have the potential to work 
with Taiwan.
A recent study of PRC international 
relations in its maritime sphere offers support 
for Powles’ contention.  Noting a great deal 
of apprehension about the PRC’s regional 
intentions now and into the future, Australian 
international relations and international law 
expert Greg Austin argues that the PRC 
has consistently sought to resolve its ocean 
frontier disputes through regional cooperation 
and adherence to international norms (Austin 
1998).  The PRC’s behaviour over disputes in 
the South China Sea is particularly important 
for Pacific Island specialists as this is closer to 
home for the PRC and involves resource and 
strategic interests that are far more important 
to the PRC than those in the South Pacific. 
Austin concludes that despite occasional 
confrontations with its neighbours over 
this area of multiple overlapping maritime 
claims, the PRC has essentially acted as a 
responsible international citizen.  According 
to Austin, ‘The behaviour of the PRC in 
respect of jurisdiction of maritime resources 
has been consistent with international law or 
with the practice of other states.  Judged by 
the standards of other states in the region, 
PRC actions have been relatively reasonable 
or accommodating’ (Austin 1998: 4; Tow 
2001:42).
Commentators from across the spectrum 
of analysis propose a variety of solutions to 
end or reduce tensions arising from recent 
Chinese actions in the Pacific Islands. Those 
more critical of current PRC and Taiwanese 
intentions and methods still see room for 
solutions by playing on both parties’ desire for 
international credibility.  Dobell suggests that 
the PRC’s behaviour in the South Pacific may 
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be increasingly conditioned by rivals such as 
the United States questioning whether the 
PRC’s rising global influence will be matched 
by its willingness to behave as a responsible 
global stakeholder.  He also notes that Taiwan 
has countered recent Australian criticism of 
its buying support in the region by noting that 
they have been driven to do so by being denied 
an ‘international space’ (ie legitimacy) in the 
international community whose rules they 
are being asked to comply with (Dobell 2007: 
16, 21).  A desperate Taiwan is in no one’s 
interests, but that prospect looms as more 
and more states court PRC favour for access 
to its domestic market, and non-transparent 
Taiwanese aid is increasingly lumped 
together with destructive Chinese business 
activities and illegal operations.  A key issue 
is whether the international community or the 
South Pacific regional community can make 
a space for Taiwan to ease the pressure on 
it to defy international aid norms while still 
being mindful of the PRC’s sensitivity to this 
issue.  There is some room for hope in the 
increasing economic interaction across the 
Straits of Taiwan that is occurring irrespective 
of the public political rhetoric emanating 
from Beijing and Taipei.
Willmott’s analysis of Chinese residents 
in the Pacific Islands provides other potential 
possibilities for solutions.  His analysis of 
distinctions within communities suggests 
that more established Chinese can act as 
intermediaries sensitive to both local needs 
and the attitudes of recently arrived Chinese. 
They also offer a potential bridge between 
Taiwanese and PRC Governments in view of 
the fact that for the most part their old regional 
and political loyalties have faded over time 
to be replaced by more local associations. 
Their interests lie in stable and prosperous 
Island communities who form their customer 
and client base.  However, the extent to 
which the PRC or Taiwanese governments 
are amenable to using local Pacific Island 
Chinese as intermediaries or advisors remains 
to be seen.  
Powles proposes three possible projects 
where South Pacific nations can cooperate 
with the PRC Government.  All are tangible, 
longer-term projects that offer potential 
benefits to all parties.  The first is promoting 
coordinated action against Chinese criminals 
as a key area where South Pacific nations 
could influence PRC policy and promote 
constructive dialogue and cooperation. 
Crocombe notes that closer coordination 
and information sharing between PRC and 
South Pacific law enforcement agencies and 
improving the resources and capabilities of 
Pacific Island police would benefit all parties 
by helping to rein in the common problem 
of Chinese criminals.  It could also act as a 
confidence-building measure from which 
other forms of dialogue and coordination 
could easily evolve (Powles 2007: 53-54; 
Crocombe 2007: 30).  
The second area of potential cooperation is 
jurisdiction over marine and seabed resources. 
The PRC has consistently and unequivocally 
committed itself to respecting Island nations’ 
rights to control their resources.  Powles 
notes that the PRC has been a responsible and 
early participant in regional forums seeking 
to establish sustainable tuna regimes (Powles 
2007: 50).  The PRC’s actions elsewhere 
also give cause for optimism.  As already 
noted, the PRC has consistently adhered to 
observing the Law of the Sea concerning 
disputed resources in the South China Sea 
that have far greater national and strategic 
relevance to it than any interests it might have 
in the Pacific Islands region (Austin 1998: 4, 
71ff).  While Taiwanese fishing fleets have 
been less cooperative, it is unrealistic to 
believe Taiwan is not sensitive to regional 
criticism when set against its chief rival’s 
official support of international maritime 
conventions, particularly in the wake of 
severe criticism from both Australia and 
New Zealand over the destabilizing effect 
of Taiwanese aid in the Solomon Islands in 
2006.  Praising the PRC for its adherence to 
international maritime conventions opens the 
way for all party cooperation on maritime 
issues.  
The last area Powles highlights for greater 
potential South Pacific cooperation with, and 
influence on, the PRC is good governance 
and foreign aid (Powles 2007: 52-53).  The 
PRC’s aid to the Pacific Islands serves 
purposes beyond competing with Taiwan 
for recognition.  As the PRC increasingly 
seeks to be taken seriously as a world and 
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Pacific power, its consistent claim to be a 
friend of small and under-developed nations 
takes on new found importance, and can 
potentially be used to encourage more PRC 
support for goals pursued by conditionalities 
imposed by other donors.  Taiwan can also 
potentially be embraced within such a 
scheme.  Taipei’s sensitivity to criticism of 
its role in destabilizing the Solomon Islands 
should not be underestimated.  The turmoil in 
the Solomon Islands in 2006 was, in part, an 
unintended and embarrassing consequence 
of Taiwan’s attempt to retain international 
recognition rather than a deliberate policy 
aim.  It may therefore be in the interests of 
both the PRC and Taiwan to pursue similar 
goals to those espoused by Australia and New 
Zealand in pursuit of their national interests 
in the region, even perhaps in collaboration 
and consultation with the latter two.  In time, 
the PRC and Taiwan might also use aid to 
Pacific Island nations to explore tentative 
steps towards informal cooperation as is 
already taking place unofficially across the 
Straits of Taiwan.  This prospect remains a 
distant hope at present, but is by no means 
impossible.  The Islands are distant enough 
and small enough to be candidates for such 
collaboration, especially if first conducted 
using South Pacific nations as intermediaries 
and collaborators.  
While national policy makers must err on 
the side of caution, overly alarmist public 
warnings and analyses about potential threats 
run the risk of creating tensions that did not 
exist beforehand.  Crocombe urges interested 
parties to apply criteria of assessment 
consistently across the board.  He wryly 
notes that ‘Chinese and Taiwanese diplomats 
interfere in Island politics more than those 
of any other country except Australia in the 
South Pacific and the USA in the North’ 
(Crocombe 2007: 27).  Taiwan could argue 
that it is being held to different standards than 
others.  Singling Taiwan out for particular 
criticism over events in Honiara, for example, 
overlooks the fact that Solomon Island 
politicians received significant payments from 
a variety of East and Southeast Asian private 
sector sources. Austin also bemoans the fact 
that ‘…few writers compare PRC actions on 
its maritime frontier in any systematic way 
with what other countries do…The PRC is 
being judged by different standards’ (Austin 
1998: 2-3).  He goes on to note that ‘Even in 
their internal studies, most governments do 
not give much credit to the possibility that the 
government in Beijing may be making every 
effort to conform to international law, even 
as it seeks to maximize the outcome - just as 
other states do’ (Austin 1998: 3).
There are signs that the PRC has been 
persuaded to rethink its decoupling of aid 
and accountability, due to hostile reactions 
from other international donors and within 
recipient countries.  In July 2007, PRC 
citizens working on development projects in 
Pakistan were targeted by local insurgents 
because they were linked to a Pakistan military 
government perceived to be unsympathetic to 
local aspirations in the impoverished west of 
the country and also because the projects use 
of PRC labour denied Pakistanis employment 
and disempowered locals.  This action 
was all the more shocking for the PRC as 
Pakistan is one of its closest allies (Hussain 
& Macartney 2007).  In Sudan, there has been 
mounting resentment towards the PRC’s 
aid programme which is seen to favour 
developing infrastructure for the oil industry 
rather than meeting the most pressing needs 
of locals (Harman 2007a).  International 
pressure is also beginning to tell. Observers 
note that the PRC has apparently modified its 
stance that troubles in Darfur are an internal 
problem for Sudan to resolve, largely as 
a result of pressure from the international 
community that threatens to undermine the 
appeal of the 2008 Beijing Olympics.  The 
PRC has announced it will contribute non-
combat units to the peace-keeping force for 
Darfur, and Sudan has been seen to be more 
accommodating over Darfur under pressure 
from PRC quiet diplomacy (Berkofsky 2007; 
Harman 2007b).  Strong criticisms of the poor 
treatment of workers at the Chinese managed 
Ramu mine by Papua New Guinea Labour 
Secretary David Tibu in February 2007 
prompted Chinese construction manager at 
the mine, Hu Zhiliang, to respond that the 
Minister’s demands for better conditions 
would be met, as ‘[w]e cannot afford to make 
this project a failure for both China and PNG’ 
(Callick 2007).
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There is potential for Australian 
collaboration with China and Taiwan in aid 
delivery if recent trends are any indication.  All 
three have developed distinct approaches and 
areas of expertise.  The PRC’s aid typically 
comes in the form of concessionary loans 
focused on infrastructure, something Western 
aid donors are reluctant to fund but which 
many developing countries consider to be of 
high priority.  The PRC also provides many 
technical education opportunities.  Faced with 
competition from the PRC in Africa, officials 
from Taiwan’s International Cooperation and 
Development Fund announced a new focus in 
2007 on areas where they believe that Taiwan 
has a competitive advantage in expertise 
over the PRC.  Areas suggested include 
agricultural science, internet technology and 
hospital resources.  All three are important 
and/or neglected areas in Pacific Island states 
as well as Africa (Jennings 2007).  Australia’s 
emphasis on good governance complements 
the focal points of the PRC and Taiwanese 
programmes.
There are also potential benefits for both 
the PRC and Taiwan in collaborating with 
Australia.  Taiwan fears it will be shut out of 
the international community and increasingly 
sees aid, and particularly humanitarian aid, as 
a means of its being accepted to work with 
the international community.  The PRC’s 
main aid administering body, the Ministry 
of Commerce (MOFCOM) is hopelessly 
understaffed in terms of capacity required to 
manage the dramatic expansion of China’s 
aid programme in recent years.  Aid to Africa 
for example is set to double by 2009, yet there 
are only seventy professional staff within 
MOFCOM to deal with all aid, recently 
estimated to be somewhere between US$1.5 
and 2 billion per annum (Lancaster 2007:2-
3, 5).  Resulting pressures have prompted the 
PRC to begin to reach out to other aid donors 
to learn from them and to tentatively explore 
potential collaboration.  The PRC now 
collaborates with Canada on aid programmes 
in the developing world and is engaged in 
close dialogue with the British Department 
for International Development (Lancaster 
2007: 6).  In late 2006, the PRC indicated a 
willingness to collaborate with New Zealand 
on South Pacific aid programmes at a meeting 
of regional aid donors in Auckland (The 
Christchurch Press, 8 November 2006).
Australia has to prepare itself for a Pacific 
region over which it has less, not more, 
influence, given the increasing problems that 
beset many of Australia’s Pacific neighbours, 
the costs of recent Australian interventions 
and aid programmes in the Pacific, and 
significant increases in East Asian aid to the 
Pacific Islands.  Most commentators agree 
that Chinese influence in the South Pacific 
will increase.  A host of factors will influence 
this increase. These include freedom of 
exit from the PRC for its citizens, freedom 
of entry into individual Pacific Island 
nations for PRC nationals, population and 
environmental pressures within the PRC that 
might persuade people to leave, the general 
receptivity of Pacific Island populations to 
Chinese migration, the levels of Chinese 
migration and investment Pacific Islanders 
consider acceptable, the skills and investment 
funds sought by Pacific Island nations 
and possessed by PRC citizens willing to 
relocate to Pacific Island nations, other, more 
attractive investment or settlement options 
than the Pacific Islands for Chinese migrants, 
and relations between the PRC, Taiwan 
and individual Pacific Island governments 
(Crocombe 2007: 33-34).  Recent promises of 
increased access to the PRC domestic market 
for Pacific Island nations’ exports may create 
significant internally-generated income for 
the latter if the experience of African nations 
granted such access is any indication (Zhang 
2007: 377).  With so many factors at play, the 
scale, rapidity, and impact of future Chinese 
migration and PRC or Taiwanese government 
influence in the Pacific Islands is by no means 
certain.  
The education sector is another key area 
of potential growth in Chinese influence. 
Crocombe notes that PRC scholarship offers 
to Islanders are increasing and that Australia 
and New Zealand can no longer take their 
own influence in Pacific Island education 
systems for granted.  Language difficulties 
have limited the uptake of PRC scholarships 
for now, but the earlier experience of Pacific 
Islander responses to Japanese scholarships 
and African responses to PRC aid suggest that 
this reticence will soon erode (Harman 2007c: 
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2).  Unless they commit more resources to 
Pacific Island education, the two former 
South Pacific colonial powers can no longer 
assume that they will deal with a political and 
bureaucratic elite broadly understanding of 
and to some degree sharing their vision and 
priorities.  Even then, the retention of such 
influence is uncertain.  Cheap access to PRC 
TV, radio and print media will only intensify 
Pacific Islanders’ exposure to differing 
outlooks and perspectives (Crocombe 
2007: 30, 31).  The retention of a dominant 
Australasian educational influence is perhaps 
not even desirable if the ultimate goal is 
stable, robust nations that do not require 
interventions to resolve internal problems 
and engage effectively with the dominant 
external influences facing them.  
In an increasingly global world, policy 
makers in Canberra and Wellington concerned 
with the best interests of their Pacific Island 
neighbours are perhaps better directed 
towards encouraging diversity in information 
and educational sources and adjusting their 
own education and media to suit the new 
reality in the Pacific discussed in this paper. 
The trends noted above raise the question of 
how long academic and government experts 
on the region can retain their value without 
at least being familiar with PRC, Taiwanese, 
and other Asian influences, outlooks and 
priorities, as well as those of Pacific Islanders. 
Enhanced preparedness through research 
into neglected trends in the region and 
adopting flexible postures to suit changing 
circumstances would seem essential.
Australia faces major challenges in 
developing the wide-ranging and flexible 
research agenda needed to understand 
and react to events in the increasingly 
interconnected Asian and Pacific regions.  The 
Australian tertiary sector faces the prospect 
of up to one third of its senior academics 
retiring in the next five to ten years.  Cuts in 
university funding since the early 1990s mean 
that few in the next generation have either the 
depth or breadth of the former generation’s 
expertise in Pacific or to a lesser extent 
Asian Studies.  Collaboration rather than 
extending individual expertise to encompass 
both the Pacific and Chinese worlds would 
seem the most sensible solution to fill this 
impending knowledge gap in South Pacific 
institutions, as both are large, diverse and 
distinct areas of study in their own right. 
Outreach to, and two-way dialogue with, 
colleagues in governments and universities 
across Australia, New Zealand, the Pacific 
Islands and Asian Pacific Rim nations is 
still relatively superficial and intermittent 
at present.  South Pacific expertise needs to 
be developed, but so also does the increased 
fostering of links with East and Southeast 
Asian government and academic experts on 
relations with the South Pacific and access 
to their publications.  The main gap in the 
literature and in South Pacific-based expertise 
is a Taiwanese perspective.  Leaving aside the 
touchy issue of Taiwan’s international status, 
it would seem highly desirable to have such 
a major player’s opinion known, understood, 
and disseminated.
ConCluSion
The next few years offer a major 
opportunity to turn potential concerns about 
changing roles of Chinese in the Pacific into 
positive outcomes.  Events in Honiara and 
Nuku’alofa in 2006 served as a wake-up call, 
and have made regional players re-evaluate 
their policies and altered their dialogue with 
each other.  As suggested above, a variety of 
responses to the increased Chinese presence 
in the Pacific Islands are available to policy 
makers in the South Pacific.  Carefully 
considered action and ongoing, informed 
dialogue may pre-empt many, if not most, of 
the concerns currently being expressed about 
the consequences of the increased Chinese 
presence in the Pacific.  Both require an 
understanding of all players’ concerns from 
their own perspectives, and a willingness to 
critically assess where perceptions of threat 
do not match reality, and how threats should 
be ranked in terms of their implications and 
degree of certainty.  Incorrect assessments and 
false assumptions may create new problems 
and inflame old ones.
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endnoteS 
1 This paper has benefited greatly from editorial 
comments made by Tony Regan, David Hegarty and 
Cameron Crouch, research conducted by Warren 
Mayes of SSGM on PRC and Taiwanese activities 
in the Pacific Islands, and information on Chinese 
matters from Tao Kong of the Economics Department 
of RSPAS.  The paper was inspired by a workshop 
on Chinese in the Pacific in February 2007 which I 
helped to organize with Drs. Li Tana and Nola Cooke 
of the Centre for the Study of the Chinese Southern 
Diaspora and Professor Brij Lal of the Division of 
Pacific and Asian History in the ANU’s Research 
School of Pacific and Asian Studies.  The published 
conference papers are listed below (D’Arcy 2007). 
The other major influences were two wide-ranging 
and perceptive papers on China in the South Pacific, 
and Australia and New Zealand’s relations with South 
Pacific nations respectively by David Hegarty of 
SSGM which the author generously gave me copies 
of and which are also listed below (Hegarty 2007a 
and 2007b).
2 The term PRC is used here for the Peoples Republic 
of China, Taiwan for the Republic of China, and 
Chinese as a collective term for all ethnic Chinese.
3 For the IWC see http://www.iwcoffice.org/.
4 For example, Palau, see Harwit 2000: 473-475; for 
Papua New Guinea, see Henderson 2001: 148-149; 
and for Vanuatu, see Zamiska and Dean, 2006.
5 The phrase South Pacific nations is used here as a 
collective term for Australia, New Zealand and the 
Pacific Islands.
6 Powles 2007.  For a contrasting view, see Henderson 
and Reilly, 2003.
7 For debate over political stability, see, for example, 
Reilly 2000 versus Fraenkel 2004.  For debate on 
ways to resolve Island nations’ economic problems 
see, for example, Hughes 2003, and Windybank and 
Manning 2003, versus Fingleton 2005.
8 Compare Dyer 2006 to Lee 2005.
9 The six are Saudi Arabia, Iran, Angola, Oman, 
Yemen, and Sudan.
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